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and until the wife elects to rescind. The rule is stated very clearly
by the Supreme Court in Pitt v. Elser:
"If she [the wife] contract to buy on a credit, and executed a note
for the price, she may or not, as she may elect, proceed with the con-
tract, and the person contracting with her cannot refuse to carry out
the agreement because she is a married woman."' 2
If the wife is less than 21 years old and makes one of the author-
ized types of contracts, she apparently can not rescind on the
ground of minority."3
Pitt v. Elser54 and other cases have held that when a wife dis-
affirms her voidable contract after she has partly performed, she
cannot get back the consideration which she has paid. The cited
case also contains a dictum that on rescinding, she must never-
theless return what she has received. This latter question seems
not fully settled; probably she must under general rules return
money or other property which she has received. However, such
return of consideration received is not a condition precedent to
her disaffirming the contract;55 an independent suit therefor would
probably lie.' Lee S. Bane.
CHANGING ONE TYPE OF MARITAL PROPERTY INTO
ANOTHER TYPE
INTRODUCTIONT HE three types of marital property are of course community
property, the wife's separate property, and the husband's sep-
arate property. There are six possibilities as to changing one
type to another; viz., 1. Changing husband's separate property to
the separate property of the wife. 2. Changing community property
52 87 Tex. at 348. 28 S. W. at 518.
58 TEx. Ray. Crv. STAT. (Vernon's 1925) art. 4625.
54 See note 50. supra.
5" Houston Loan and Investment Co. v. Abernathy, 131 Tex. 601, 117 S. W. (2d)
1089, (Tex. Comm. App. 1938).
56 See note, 17 TEX. L. REV. 218 (1939).
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to the separate property of the wife. 3. Changing community prop-
erty to husband's separate property. 4. Changing the wife's sep-
arate property to the husband's separate property. 5. Changing the
wife's separate property to community property. 6. Changing hus-
band's separate property to community property. These possibili-
ties will be grouped in pairs in the following discussion.
CHANGING THE HUSBAND'S SEPARATE PROPERTY AND THE
COMMUNITY PROPERTY TO THE WIFE'S SEPARATE
PROPERTY
Our community property system completely ignores the old
common law idea of unity of husband and wife as an impediment
to the making of conveyances by one to the other. "Generally what-
ever may be the subject of a transfer may be passed from one
spouse to the other."' The husband can convey all2 or any' of his
separate property or his half of existing community property di-
rectly to his wife4 so as to make it her separate property.5 Trus-
tees are not necessary,' but of course the deed can be from the
husband to a trustee and then to the wife if desired.7 In such a
deed from husband to wife, there is no necessity for the wife's
1 SPEER, LAW OF MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS, p. 156 (2nd Ed., 1916).
2 Green v. Ferguson, 62 Tex. 525 (1884).
8 Southern Pacific v. Ulmer, 286 S. W. 193 at 194 (Tex. Com. App. 1926) states:
"Subject to the prior rights of creditors, the husband, under our law, has always had
the right to give to the wife, as her separate property, any part of the community
estate"; Bullock v. Englert, 125 S. W. (2d) 663 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
4 Frame v. Frame, 120 Tex. 61, 36 S. W. (2d) 152 (1931) ; Kahn v. Kahn, 94 Tex.
114, 68 S. W. 825 (1900) ; Riley v. Wilson, 86 Tex. 240, 24 S. W. 394 (1893) ; Story
v. Marshall, 24 Tex. 306 (1859).
5 Breckenridge v. Coffield, 283 S. W. 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) writ of error re-
fused; see cases collected in 37 A.L.R. 282 et. seq.
6 Story v. Marshall, supra, note 4; Johnson v. Scott, 208 S. W. 671 (Tex. Civ. App.
1919) writ of error refused; and in Smith v. Boquet, 27 Tex. 507, 513 (1864), the court
citing Story v. Marshall said: "It is also an admitted principle that a husband may
make a gift or grant of the community, or his separate property to his wife, without
the intervention of trustees, by a conveyance directly to her."
7 SPER, op. cit. supra, note 1 at p. 192.
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joinder or written consent' even in a state where husband and wife
must join in a conveyance of community property.'
When the husband conveys real property to his wife, whether
it be his separate or community, it is presumed to be her separate
property;'0 therefore, no recitals that it is to be her separate prop-
erty are necessary in the deed." The act itself evidences the hus-
8 Griffin v. Troup, 163 S. W. (2d) 412 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) writ of error refused;
Cushenberry v. Profit, 153 S. W. (2d) 291 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) writ of error refused;
Savage v. Rhea, 33 S. W. (2d) 429 (Tex. Com. App. 1930) ; TEX. REv. Crv. STAT.
(Vernon 1925) art. 4619 states: "During coverture the common property of husband
and wife may be disposed of by husband only."
s Though in Texas both husband and wife must join and she must separately
acknowledge a deed of the homestead, whether it be the husband's separate property
or the community property. Gonzales v. Gonzales, 115 Tex. 16, 273 S. W. 798 (1925) ;
Smith v. Elliot, 39 Tex. 201 (1873). Nevertheless, a husband's deed directly to his
wife of the homestead will be upheld without wife's joinder or separate acknowledge-
ment. White v. White, 141 Tex. 328, 172 S. W. (2d) 295 (1943) ; McGovern v. Woolley,
200 S. W. 271 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) writ of error dismissed; The case of Martin v.
Barnum, 286 S. W. 550, 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) reasoned thus for this holding:
"The policy of the homestead law is to protect the family, the wife and children, in
the enjoyment of a home, and it was not the purpose of this statute (saying that wife
must join in a conveyance of homestead) to make void a conveyance thereof by
husband directly to his wife and children, under which they would. necessarily be as
much protected as they could be if no conveyance of the homestead was made or the
attempted conveyance was invalid, because of the failure of the wife to join therein.
The conveyance met the approval of the wife and was accepted by her, and the family
continued to reside thereon..."
A husband, in Arizona, cannot convey community realty without wife's joinder. A
conveyance made by husband alone is void. Cook v. Stephens, 51 Ariz. 467, 77 P. (2d)
1100 (1938). But the case of Schofield v. Gold, 26 Ariz. 296, 225 Pac. 71 (1924);
37 A.L.R. 275 points out that this statute does not mean that one spouse cannot alone
execute a conveyance of his or her share to the other. In joining in the conveyance to
a third person, each is acting for himself and herself, and each holds the same interest
in the property conveyed, so there is no reason why one, even the wife, may not convey
his or her interest to other without both having to join as grantors.
10 It was said in Story v. Marshall, supra, note 4 at 308 (where husband conveyed
community property directly to his wife) "There can be, in this case, no presumption, as
in the case of a purchase from a stranger in the name of the wife, that funds of the
community were employed in making the purchase, and therefore it is community
property. But the conveyance being of community property of the parties between
whom the conveyance is made, prima facie, the presumption must be that it was in.
tended to change its character from community property to the separate property
of the wife."
" Lewis v. Simon, 72 Tex. 470, 10 S. W. 554 (1889); Forman v. Glasgow, 219
S. W. (2d) 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); and Callahan v. Houston, 78 Tex. 494, 14
S. W. 1027, 1028 (1890), where Chief Justice Stayton said "The land in controversy
came to the husband through a regular chain of transfer from the sovereignty of the
soil, and he conveyed it to his wife during marriage through a deed which on its face
showed that it was a gift. This made the property the separate estate of the wife, and
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band's intent to make it her separate property, because the deed
could ordinarily have no other meaning. 2 However, this presump-
tion can be rebutted, when there are no express recitals in the deed
showing an intent to make it the wife's separate property, by evi-
dence that husband and wife did not intend for the land to be-
come the wife's separate property at the time the deed was exe-
cuted."3 But, if the deed contains express recitals to the effect that
the husband intends the land to become his wife's separate prop-
erty, or recitals of consideration which if moving from her would
give it the character of her separate property, then these recitals
show a clear intent on his part to convey the land as her separate
property and parol evidence is not admissible as to the parties to
the deed to show that such was not his intent' (except on direct
attack based on fraud, mistake, etc.). Therefore, such recitals
are desirable from the wife's standpoint.
In order to effectively change the husband's separate realty or
community realty to the wife's separate property, the title must
pass by deed, judgment, or other means recognized by law, ex-
actly the same as with transactions between parties not spouses.
there was no necessity that he should have expressed in the deed his intent so to
make it. The deed executed by him made the land the separate property of the wife."
12 Forman v. Glasgow, supra, note 11, cited SPEER, op. cit. supra, note 1 at p. 183.
"In the absence of any evidence of intention outside of the deed of conveyance by a
husband to the wife, where it was shown that no consideration passed, and that men-
tioned in the deed was purely nominal, our Supreme Court held that such deed must
be taken as evidencing the intent, which upon its face, it imports---that is, to convey
to the wife the estate of the husband in the property; ..."
23 TEx. JUR. § 128, p. 157, 158, was cited as follows: "The effect of the husband's
deed to the wife, whether the subject of the conveyance be his separate or community,
is to constitute the estate the separate estate of the grantee. The instrument could
have no other meaning, and this is true whether it recites that the conveyance is for
the sole separate use of the grantee or not. Where no consideration passes or a mere
nominal one is stated, the courts construe the transaction as evidencing an intention
to donate."
1 Forman v. Glasgow, supra, note 11 at 847 said: "In determining effect of a deed
of realty by husband to wife, the intention of the parties at the time of the taking of
the deed is controlling."
14 Nye v. Bradford, 144 Tex. 618, 193 S. W. (2d) 165 (1946) ; Davis v. Davis, 141
Tex. 613, 175 S. W. (2d) 226 (1943); Kahn v. Kahn, 94 Tex. 114. 58 S. W. (2d)
825 (1900).
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Therefore, the husband cannot abandon all interest in his prop-
erty, and the wife, by taking charge of it and exercising dominion
over it, cannot convert it into her separate property. Abandon-
ment of land title is not recognized in Texas.15 A mere agreement
between husband and wife will not be enough; it must be some
type of conveyance.16
The subject matter of a conveyance from the husband to wife
must be in esse at the time of the purported conveyance. The
spouses have iuo power to change, by mere advance agreement
(either postnuptial 7 or antenuptial'), the status of property yet
to come into existence or yet to be acquired.' 9 However, after the
propcrty has been acquired and its status has been fixed, the hus-
band then may convey it to his wife and it will become her sepa-
rate property.20 A dictum in Gorman v. Gause says that a contract
by which one spouse agreed to transfer to the other his interest in
community property when later acquired, would be valid. This
dictum seems correct on principle, since the well established rule
that the character of property cannot be changed before the prop.
erty comes into existence, is not violated. The property would
later come into existence with its status exactly the same as if
there had been no contract. Furthermore, the contract would not
automatically change such initial status. That status would be
changed only when and if the obligor executed a conveyance of
his now existing property, which of course under established rules
he can do. The Gorman case involved an antenuptial contract, but
-r Texas Co. v. Davis, 113 Tex. 321, 254 S. W. 304 (1923) ; W. T. Waggoner Estate
v. Sigler Oil Co., 284 S. W. 921 (Tex. Com. App. 1926).
16 Kellett v. Trice, 95 Tex. 160, 66 S. W. 51 (1902) ; Magee v. White, 23 Tex.
180 (1859).
17 Green v. Ferguson, supra, note 2; Robbins v. Robbins, 125 S. W. (2d) 666 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1939) ; Davis v. Davis, 108 S. W. (2d) 681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
18Gorman v. Gause, 56 S. W. (2d) 855 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933) affirmed, but not
adopted by Sp. Ct.; Chandler v. Alamo Mfg. Co., 140 S. W. (2d) 918 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940).
"I Frame v. Frame, supra, note 4; Strickland v. Wester, 131 Tex. 23, 112 S. W.
(2d) 1047 (1938) ; Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S. W. 799 (1925).
25 Robbins v. Robbins, supra, note 17; Frame v. Frame, supra, note 4; Green v.
Ferguson, supra, note 2.
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the dictum could apparently be applied to postnuptial contracts as
well.
The conveyance from husband to wife can be for a considera-
tion or as a gift. Consideration must be from the wife's separate
property, for if it were community property, the property con-
veyed by the husband would become (or remain) community prop-
ert by the theory of mutations.2
A conveyance from husband to wife of his separate or the com-
munity property will be upheld only if it does not operate in fraud
of the rights of prior creditors, and subsequent bona fide purchas-
ers." Corpus Juris Secundum3 says: "No person can question the
validity of a conveyance from husband to wife unless he was the
creditor of the husband or the community before the conveyance
was made 4 or was a subsequent purchaser without notice."25
The most recent way to change community property to the sep-
arate property of the wife (and of the husband) was made possi-
ble by a 1948 amendment to the Texas Constitution, which au-
thorizes the spouses to partition their existing community prop-
erty. 6 This is to be done by an instrument in writing which parti-
tions the community property into undivided shares or in severalty,
which shall be the separate property of each spouse. This amend-
ment also authorizes husband and wife to exchange between them-
selves the community interest of one spouse in any property for
the community interest of the other spouse in other community
21 Kohner v. Ashenauer, 17 Cal. 579 (1861) held that a conveyance from husband
to wife of community property must be done either as a gift, the husband being free
from debts or liabilities, or in exchange for separate property of the wife. And unless
it was so transferred it was subject to his disposition thereafter as it had been
previously.
22 Maddon v. Summerlin, 92 Tex. 483, 49 S. W. 1033 (1899) ; Lewis v. Simon, supra,
note 11; Brown v. Brown, 61 Tex. 56 (1885).
23 41 C. J. S. § 516, 1096.
24 Peterson v. First National Bank, 101 Cal. App. 532, 281 Pac. 1104 (1929) ; Glover
v. Brown, 32 Idaho 426, 184 Pac. 649 (1919); Seaton v. Smith, 186 Wash. 447, 58 P.
(2d) 830 (1936).
23 Houston Oil Co. of Tex. v. Choate, 232 S. W. 285 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921);
Glover v. Brown, supra, note 24.
26 Tax. CONST., Art. XVI, § 15, was amended.
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property, thereby making the portion set aside to each his separate
property. 7
CHANGING THE WIFE'S SEPARATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMUNITY
PROPERTY TO THE HUSBAND'S SEPARATE PROPERTY
The Texas Courts were slow to hold that a wife could convey
her separate property so as to make it the separate property of
her husband, due to the dread of undue influence by the husband
on the wife. At an early date the rule was established that she
could not directly convey her separate property to the husband,2"
but it was finally decided for the first time in 1893, in Riley v.
Wilson,29 that a wife could make a gift of her separate real estate
to her husband, by joining with him in a conveyance to a third
party, complying fully with the law as to privy acknowledgment,
and then causing such party to reconvey the land to her husband
as his separate property. "By this method, she has received all the
protection the law deems essential to her prudence of action and
power to convey.""
The court, in reaching this decision started out with the premise
that in Texas, husband and wife have equal rights to take and
hold property in their separate right. From here it said that if it
were not for the disability of the wife to convey her land without
the joinder of her husband, her power to convey to him without
the intervention of a third party would be as clear as his power
27 TEX. CONST., Art. XVI, § 15, as amended Nov. 2, 1948; TEx. CIv. STATS., Art.
4624a, effective May 21, 1949.
Prior to this amendment, Texas did not allow husband and wife to partition the
community property during the marriage. 23 TEx. Jum. § 83, 105; Bruce v. Permian
Royalty Co., 186 S. W. (2d) 686 (Ct. of Civ. App. 1945) writ of error refused IV. M.
If the spouses obtain a divorce and the decree does not include a property settle.
ment, they become tenants in common as to the former community property, and as
such either party can force a partition. Taylor v. Catalon, 140 Tex. 38, 166 S. W. (2d)
102 (1942).
28 Graham v. Struwe, 76 Tex. 533, 13 S. W. 381 (1890).
29 86 Tex. 240, 24 S. W. 394 (1893).
8o Id. at 243, 24 S. W. at 396.
Accord; Taylor v. Hollingsworth, 142 Tex. 158, 176 S. W. (2d) 733 (1943); Davis
v. Davis, 141 Tex. 613, 175 S. W. (2d) 226 (1943) ; Kellett v. Trice, 95 Tex. 160, 66
S. W. 51 (1902).
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to convey directly to her; but, "as she can convey only by a deed
in which he joins, they cannot make a deed directly to him, for no
person can contract with himself."'"
Requiring the wife's separate acknowledgement with the privy
examination protects her from any coercive influence which might
be exercised by the husband or other persons; and requiring the
husband's joinder protects the wife from undue influence of others
in that he gives her counsel and advice. When the conveyance is
made to the trustee with the ultimate intention of making it the
husband's separate property, it is not expected that the wife will
have the benefit of her husband's unbiased advice, nor is it neces-
sary to the validity of the transaction, but she does have the pro-
tection of a privy examination and separate acknowledgement be-
fore a notary public, and as has been stated, this protection is
deemed sufficient.
Since Texas law permits the wife to make a gift of her separate
property to the husband in the aforesaid manner, a fortiori she
may transfer to him for a consideration. (The consideration must,
of course, be from his separate property.) The Texas courts have
so held."
By the same reasoning and by the same method as was used in
Riley v. Wilson, we can safely conclude that the wife may trans-
fer her interest in the community property to her husband's sepa-
rate estate. A Texas court has never held that this could not be
done; however, it has been held that any attempt to change com-
munity property to separate property will be closely scrutinized
3186 Tex. at 241, 24 S. W. at 395; Tnx. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon 1948) art. 1299
states: "The husband and wife shall join in the conveyance of real estate, the separate
roperty of the wife; and no such conveyance shall take effect until the same shall
ave been acknowledged by her privily and apart from her husband before some officer
authorized by law to take acknowledgments to deeds for the purpose of being recorded,
and certified to in the mode pointed out in articles 6605 and 6608."
82 Ibid.
88 In Taylor v. Hollingsworth, supra, note 30, at 736, the court, speaking of the
wife's separate property, said: "It is true that the husband and wife, by their deed
properly acknowledged, can convey property to a third person, and such third person
can convey such property to the husband, either with or without consideration, although




by the courts, and "if there be a doubt as to the validity of the
transaction it will be resolved in favor of the community."'s4 It
has also been held that the husband cannot, by gift to himself,
make the community property his separate property.3 5
A textwriter has stated that the wife has this power to convey
her interest in community property to the husband's separate
estate;3 6 and this contention is supported by a dictum in Collett v.
Houston." Two civil appeals cases directly hold that the wife has
the power when a trustee is utilized. In Stratton v. Robinson,3" the
wife owned an undivided one half interest in 160 acres, the other
half being community property in the husband's name. Husband
and wife conveyed to a trustee, for a nominal consideration, "our
undivided interest of one half," and on the same day the trustee
conveyed the same described interest back to the husband. The
question was, which undivided interest did the parties intend to
convey to the trustee? The court acknowledged that by the method
employed and the language of the deeds, they could have conveyed
the wife's separate interest to the husband as his separate property,
but concluded that they intended to change their community prop-
erty interest to the husband's separate property, and that each
spouse was entitled to an undivided one half interest in said land
as the separate property of each.
In Barnett v. Barnett39 the husband lent his wife $2,000 from
his separate estate in consideration of her conveying to him "all
sKing v. Bruce, 197 S. W. (2d) 830 at 838 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) reversed on
other grounds.
35 Rowlett v. Mitchell, 114 S. W. 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
30 SPEER, LAW OF MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS, 181 (3rd Ed. 1929) states: "The
husband may convey his interest in a specific piece of community property to his wife,
and likewise, the wife may convey similarly to the husband, subject only to the statutes
of conveyancing, or they may make exchanges of separate property for community
property or vice versa."
87 186 S. W. 232, 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) writ of error refused, saying "the in-
terest of either party, husband or wife (in community property), may be conveyed or
donated to the other, subject to certain limitations."
8828 Tex. Civ. App. 285, 67 S. W. 539 (1902) writ of error refused. This case was
cited with approval, and distinguished from the case then at bar in Davis v. Davis, 141
Tex. 613, 175 S. W. (2d) 226 (1943).
89 206 S. W. (2d) 273 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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of her interest in all of the property, both real and personal, owned
by the husband." 4 To do this, they joined in conveying all of the
community property to a trustee with the agreement that he should
immediately convey it to the husband so that the wife would have
no interest in it. The court held that the conveyance to the husband
through a trustee passed title to the wife's interest in the community
property then in existence.
Since the husband can convey property (except homestead)
without the wife's joinder, it follows that if the landis in his name,
she need not join in his deed to the trustee. However, she must
consent to the deed; otherwise his conveying community property
so as to make it his separate property would almost certainly be
fraud on her. And, of course, the most clearcut consent is her
joinder. The same reasoning applies when the community prop-
erty is in the wife's name, i.e., the husband's deed to the trustee,
with her consent, is sufficient-or she alone may convey to the
trustee, with the husband's consent because community property
is involved- It is possible that her deed direct to the husband would
be upheld, because he, of course, would consent thereto.
Partition of existing community property (discussed under the
preceding major topic) should again be mentioned as the most
recent way to change community property to separate property.
CHANGING SEPARATE PROPERTY INTO COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Texas cases clearly establish the rule that the husband and wife
cannot, by mere agreement whether written or oral, change sepa-
rate into community property. This applies with equal force to
40 Id. at 277.
41 Tittle v. Tittle -..... Tex ........ 220 S. W. (2d) 637 (1949); Belkin v. Ray, 142
Tex. 71, 176 S. W. (2d) 162 (1944) ; Taylor v. Hollingsworth, 142 Tex. 158, 176 S. W.
(2d) 733 (1943) ; Kellett v. Trice, 95 Tex. 160, 66 S. W. 51 (1902).
States in accord:
New Mexico---"Parties cannot transmute separate into community property by the
mere will of the parties," McDonald v. Lambert, 43 N. M. 27, 85 P. (2d) 78 (1938).
States contra:
Calif.-A written or oral agreement, just so long as there is a meeting of the minds
is sufficient to transmute separate property of husband or wife into community prop-
erty. Kenney v. Kenney, 220 Cal. 134, 30 Pac. (2d) 398 (1934) ; Siberell v. Siberell,
1950)
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the separate property of either spouse.42 When the facts surround-
ing the acquisition of property are such that it becomes separate
property by the terms of the statutes (and the Constitution, in the
case of the wife), 43 then the property must remain separate prop-
erty until the existence of the facts necessary under the law to
effect a change. To allow a mere agreement to change separate to
community would destroy the statutes defining separate property.
Only through conveyances could such a change by any possibility
be effectuated.
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in following the Texas de-
cisions, said that the manner of acquisition must be such that the
property is community within the meaning of the law at the time
it is acquired, even if from husband or wife.4
It has been attempted to change separate property into com-
munity property by a deed of husband's or wife's separate prop-
erty to a trustee, who deeds it back to the spouses with the express
purpose of converting it into community property. 5 The courts
look through these purported conveyances and say that this was
"merely an attempt by the agreement of husband and wife to con-
vert that which the law made separate property of one into com-
mon property of the two."46 The deeds are held not to be convey-
ances of title, but in substance the transaction is held to be only
the forbidden agreement by which a change in character of title
is attempted, without the existence of the facts necessary under
214 Cal. 767, 7 P. (2d) 1003 (1932); In re Hendersons Estate, 128 Cal. App. 397,
17 P. (2d) 786; Vieux v. Vieux, 80 Cal. App. 22, 251 Pac. 640; Bias v. Reed, 169
Cal. 33, 145 Pac. 516 (1914).
Wash.-Spouses can change separate property to community property by a written
agreement, but not by oral agreement of the spouses alone. Rogers v. Joughin, 152
Wash. 448, 277 Pac. 988 (1929) ; State ex rel Van Moss v. Sailors, 180 Wash. 269, 39
P. (2d) 397 (1934) ; Volz. v. Zang, 113 Wash. 378, 194 Pac. 409 (1920).
42 Tittle v. Tittle, supra, note 41.
4s TFx. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon 1925) art. 4613-Husband's separate property de-
fined; TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon 1925) art. 4614-Wife's separate property defined;
Tax. CONST., Art. XVI, § 15.
44 McDonald v. Lambert, 43 N. M. 27, 85 P. (2d) 78 (1938).
45 Tittle v. Tittle, supra, note 41; Kellett v. Trice, supra, note 16.
46 Kellett v. Trice, supra, note 16, at 53.
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the law to effect the change." Therefore the property remains
separate property. This result-although it seems odd to consider
two attempted conveyances as being one attempted contract-is
clearly sound: there was no real consideration; therefore the trans-
action could not have been valid except as a gift; that would have
produced separate property, not community.
However, in the very same situation, if neither the deed of the
separate property to the trustee nor the deed back to husband and
wife contains any expression of an agreement or intent to convert
the land into community property, the transaction is not void;
because the legal effect of the two deeds without consideration
constitutes this property the separate property of husband and
wife in undivided halves, as co-tenants.48 The distinction is that
in the former situation, the transaction is completely void, because
such deeds cannot convert the land into community property, and
to hold that title passed to the spouses as co-tenants would con-
tradict the express terms of the deeds. 9 In the latter situation,
where the deeds recite no intention to create community property,
husband and wife by operation of law on the facts hold an undi-
vided one-half interest each as to co-tenants, on the theory of gift
to both of them from the one who owned the property at the
outset.50
In Texas, all property that husband or wife acquire after mar-
riage by gift, devise, or descent is the separate property of the
donee." Therefore, neither spouse can make a gift of separate
property to the community, by agreement, conveyance or other-
wise (nor can a third party make a gift which will be community
property); a gift must by statutory definition be separate prop-
47 Tittle v. Tittle, supra, note 41.
4sBelkin v. Ray, supra, note 41. The Supreme Court ruled that these instruments
on their face showed no intent to convert the separate property into community prop-
erty and that parol evidence to show such intent is inadmissible.
4' Tittle v. Tittle, supra, note 41.
so Belkin v. Ray, supra, note 41.




erty.5" "The Texas Courts reason that the definition of community
property does not include gifts made to either spouse" and that
the spouse named as the grantee of the gift is an individual donee,
despite an expressed intent to convey to that spouse as a repre-
sentative of the community."54
A dictum in the Kellett case left open a possible way to change
separate property into community when the court stated: "It may
be that a purchase may be made of such separate property by the
husband with community funds, so that the consideration will be-
long to the wife separately and the property taking its place will
belong to the community estate."55 There have been no cases di-
rectly on this point, but there seems to be no reason why the courts
should not follow this dictum. On principle, there seems to be no
policy against it. Since the wife can change her separate property
to the husband's separate property, it would seem a fortiori that
she can change her separate property to community property. The
best method to do this without violating the principles already
laid down, would appear to be for the spouses to join in a deed
to a trustee, who would pay the wife the value of the land; then
the trustee would convey to the husband in return for community
money in the same amount. (The wife could probably be grantee,
if the husband paid, or consented to her paying, the community
money, or if under the probable meaning of Hawkins v. Britton
52 Kellett v. Trice, supra, note 16: Shook v. Shook, 125 S. W. 638 (Tex. Civ. App.
1910) writ of error dismissed, and Benjamin State Bank v. Reed, 139 S. W. (2d) 172,
at 175 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), where the court stated: "We recognize that separate
property of husband or wife may be the subject of a gift by either to the other, but
we think there is no warrant in law or logic for the proposition that the separate
property of either spouse may be the subject of a gift to the community estate as
something distinct from a gift to the husband or wife."
5' TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon 1936) art. 4619, excludes this property from that
category.
54 See comment, 18 TEx. L. REv. 227, 228 (1940).
55 Kellett v. Trice, supra, note 16 at 54, 55.
The New Mexico Supreme Court in McDonald v. Lambert, supra, note 44, at 83,
also indicated this possible solution when it stated as dicta that "undoubtedly separate
property may be conveyed by one spouse to the other: or if community funds are used




State Bank," she paid certain types of "special community"
money.) Similarly it would seem the husband's separate property
can be changed to community property. Possibly the trustee could
be eliminated by the husband's direct deed to the wife, for a com-
munity consideration which he had consented for her to transfer
(or which the principle of the Hawkins case may authorize her
to transfer).
The Tittle case showed that the consideration had to be more
than mutual promises to convey to the community to meet this
dictum. Also, the consideration must be more than nominal or the
transaction will be branded as a gift. 7
SUMMARY
The husband can convey community property and his separate
property directly to the wife as a gift, or for a consideration from
her separate estate, without the intervention of a trustee. When
so done it is presumed to be her separate property and will not
be set aside unless it operates in fraud of the rights of prior credi-
tors and subsequent bona fide purchasers. The presumption is
conclusive (except in a direct attack) as to parties to the deed
when it expressly shows the husband's intent to make the land the
wife's separate property; but it is rebuttable when these recitals
are absent. The husband cannot convey community property or his
separate property to the wife until it has been acquired and its
status fixed by operation of law on the facts under which it was
acquired. However, it seems possible that a contract (prenuptial
or antenuptial) by which one spouse agrees to transfer to the other
his interest in the community property when later acquired, would
be valid. A recent constitutional amendment provides a method
by which the spouses can partition their community property and
thus change it to their separate estates.
The wife can convey her separate property, and her interest in
56 122 Tex. 69, 52 S. W. (2d) 243 (1932) ; comment, Control and Disposition of
Special Community Property, 4 SOUTF!WFSTERN L. J. 88 ( 1950).
57 Bradley v. Love, 60 Tex. 472 (1883) ; note on Tittle v. Tittle, 28 TEx. L. REv.
275 (1949).
1950.]
